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$EVWUDFW
The purpose of this paper is to outline the concept of technological infrastructures 
and to give a broad discussion of policy approaches to these infrastructures. I first 
outline some general features of generic technology or knowledge; the area that has 
been the prime focus of market failure arguments for innovation policies over the last 
decades. 
Related to the concept of generic knowledge is the concept of technological 
infrastructures. These infrastructures have traditionally been described in terms of 
structures of national institutions providing generic knowledge in the form of RTO 
services. Reviewing the literature we argue that the concept may be developed to a 
more fruitful concept of technological infrastructures that are more closely related to 
the nature of the economic resources or services provided by the infrastructure. This 
approach unties the strong definitional links between the traditionalised concept and 
the institutions providing these services.  
This has the rather immediate consequence of allowing a more nuanced approach to 
those innovation policies that address the establishment and maintenance of 
technological infrastructures. This allows the policy formulation process to address 
the economic resources more directly, but at the same time this disentangling puts 
more exacting demands on the capabilities of the policy maker. 
I give a preliminary overview of main trends of innovation policies in the post-war 
period. This overview indicates how policy approaches to technological 
infrastructures have changed during this period, and how in particular how there has 
been a drift of policy thinking from institutionally based policies over the main parts 
of the post-war period, with supplementing functional approaches becoming evident 
over the last two decades. 
The functional, or resource based, approach to technological infrastructures allows us 
to describe ongoing structural changes of these infrastructures. Through an outline of 
some main aspects of these structural changes, with increasing market based supply 
of innovation related services, and its immediate policy implications we suggest that 
TIP policies must fully embrace a functional approach to accommodate the impact of 
these changes. 
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7HFKQRORJLFDOLQIUDVWUXFWXUHVDQGLQQRYDWLRQSROLFLHV
*HQHULFNQRZOHGJHDQGWHFKQRORJ\
*HQHULFWHFKQRORJ\DQG
SXEOLFJRRG

The Arrow-Nelson rationale (based on the ’public good’ character of research-based 
knowledge) is discussed elsewhere. However, different justifications for public 
involvement emerge from a ’systems’ perspective. Basically these stem from the 
focus on systemic innovation and the fact that technology is not infinitely socially 
malleable. Technology is obdurate – there are objective technical characteristics that 
play a fundamental role in shaping the ongoing social development of productive 
knowledge. The malleability/obduracy distinction is borrowed from Bijker (1995); 
an analysis that demonstrates the importance of obduracies in shaping technological 
development is Vincenti's book on the history of aeronautics (Vincenti 1990).  
Related to the existence of technological obduracies, is the notion of JHQHULF
WHFKQRORJ\: productive (hence, valuable) knowledge, general in use across a wide 
range of users and social, technological and geographical regions or fields. Seen as 
productive knowledge, technology may broadly be split into generic and specific 
technology, the difference of which was outlined by Richard Nelson as follows: 
 On the one hand, a technology consists of a body of generic knowledge, in 
the form of generalizations about how things work, key variables influencing 
performance, the nature of currently binding constraints and approaches to 
pushing these back, widely applicable problem-solving heuristics etc. Dosi 
has called these packages of generic knowledge 'technological paradigms'. ... 
Much, if not all, of the JHQHULFNQRZOHGJHWHQGVWRKDYHSURSHUWLHVRIDODWHQW
SXEOLFJRRG>DQG@WHQGVWREHZLGHO\DSSOLFDEOHDQGJHUPDQHWRDYDULHW\RI
XVHUV. Access to generic knowledge may be essential if one hopes to advance 
further the technology ... Also, in a system where there is considerable inter-
firm mobility of scientists and engineers, generic knowledge is very difficult 
to keep proprietary. ...  
 On the other hand, a technology also comprises a collection of specific ways 
of doing things, or artefacts, which are known to be effective in achieving 
their ends LISHUIRUPHGRUXVHGZLWKUHDVRQDEOHVNLOOin the appropriate con-
text ... [A] good part of [extant techniques] is not appropriately ... characte-
rized [as possessing latent public good properties, in the sense that certain 
techniques are widely applicable]. ... [A] good portion of techniques is of 
rather narrow application, being WDLORUHGWRWKH>VSHFLILF@DWWULEXWHVRIWKH
SURGXFWVDQGSURFHVVHVRISDUWLFXODUILUPV. Thus the restriction of access 
entails little cost. (Nelson 1988): 314-15, our emphasis) 
Generic technology has both obdurate and (socially) malleable dimensions: 'how 
things work' vs problem-solving heuristics etc., while specific knowledge is more 
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dominated by the latter. Specific technology has use value only in a restricted, 
specific social context, and hence, LQH[WUHPLV, has no exchange value though it may 
be fully appropriable. Generic technology is in principle not (fully) appropriable and 
has substantial aggregate use value. We might claim as Nelson does that generic, in 
contrast to specific, technology has (latent) public good characteristics (i.e. it is non-
rival and non-excludable) and hence (latently) no exchange value. To do this we 
need to bring in one further aspect.  
This is usually done by recourse to a distinction between codified and tacit 
knowledge which is complementary to the generic/specific distinction; see e.g. David 
and Foray (1995). These two pairs are often interconnected. Generic technology is 
more likely to exist in codified forms and specific technology is dominated more by 
tacit forms of expression. But they are not identical. Codification of technology - a 
transformation of productive knowledge into information that is depersonalised, 
decontextualised, mobile and accessible to a wide range of unconnected potential 
users - usually undermines convincing threats of enforcing excludability. With low 
or vanishing transaction costs such information has public-good characteristics. 
Hence there will in general be underprovision, relative to the socially optimal level 
of production, of such knowledge in a market system. 
Generic and specific knowledges do not operate separately. Use of one in general 
requires use of the other. Thus, limitations in provision of one has consequences for 
the generation of benefits, whether private or social, from the other. Firstly, 
accessing and using generic technology requires a process of ’specification’. This will 
usually entail a fundamental transformation and reinterpretation of generic 
knowledge based on extensive, often tacit, interpretative abilities. (There is a similar 
second-round argument for these interpretative competencies.)  Substantial 
investment needed in building these abilities may imply strong conditions of 
excludability. To the extent that this generic knowledge is otherwise non-excludable, 
its codified forms are public goods within a subset of agents that have done this 
investment. This is a substantial element in the formation of durable techno-
economic networks (Bell and Callon 1994). 
There is also a more important dynamic interaction between generic and specific 
technologies. The evident complementarities of these technologies imply strong 
contingencies in their respective development. An underprovision of generic 
productive knowledge will thus have substantial impact on the development of 
specific technologies (and YLFHYHUVD) and hence on the technological horizons or 
perceived opportunities of firms. The interaction of generic and specific technologies 
is an important determinant of the evolution of technological histories or trajectories 
of individual firms or of groups of firms, of the creation of coherence in economic 
growth. 
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*HQHULFWHFKQRORJ\DQGUDWLRQDOHVIRUSXEOLFLQWHUYHQWLRQ
With the caveats outlined above we may use the term generic technology to denote 
that part of generic technology where ’public goods’ characteristics are substantial. 
By implication, such generic technology is: 
• Durable: Once developed it depreciates slowly; 
• Multi-user: It has use value for several agents, often with 
• Low transaction costs; implying that 
• Ensuring appropriation by a firm or a network of firms requires setting up 
substantial measures (collective such as intellectual property rights, or private 
through joint ventures or other collusive mechanisms). 
 
As indicated by Richard Nelson, this conceptualisation of generic technology is 
related to Giovanni Dosi’s idea of technological paradigms, the envelope of related 
technological trajectories of individual firms. Similar concepts are ubiquitous in the 
literature on technical change, alternatively termed technological JXLGHSRVWV, UHJLPHV 
or V\VWHPV. The idea that these concepts attempt to purvey is of a ’super-structure’ of 
productive knowledge, enabling and enhancing the generation and utility of specific 
knowledge. Such paradigms have an important function. One of their important roles 
is to define the set of techno-economic criteria and considerations that guide firms in 
their choice and implementation of technically changed products, processes and 
organisation. There is thus a close relation between the notion of paradigms and 
general characteristics of market competition. Hence, paradigms or systems give 
character and direction to technological development or trajectories.  
Approaching the concept from several angles, we thus see that such paradigms FXP 
generic technology are vital ingredients of the process of innovation, technical 
change and economic development. At the same time the provision of such generic 
technology will not be socially optimal if based on private, market-based provision. 
Loosely the term NQRZOHGJHLQIUDVWUXFWXUHhas been used for the totality of generic 
knowledge or technology in an innovation system. The development and 
institutionalisation of such knowledge infrastructures have been prominent objectives 
of innovation policies in the postwar period. The production-line interpretation of the 
link between generation of knowledge and its (commercial) application suggests a 
trade off between provision of generic technology through publicly accessible 
infrastructure institutions (e.g. universities or advisory agencies) and subsidized 
generation by firms or networks of firms. The possible scope of public intervention 
with systemic approaches encompasses a wide range of interaction processes in the 
innovation system, directed also towards processes of knowledge generation, 
diffusion and firms’ propensities and abilities to access and use generic technology. 
Thus the need for generation of knowledge supported by public intervention covers 
substantial parts of the economic environment of firms. This raises the need for 
improved understanding of the relations between the firm and its environment, of 
which a properly understood and constituted knowledge infrastructure forms a 
significant part. 
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However, ’infrastructure’ is a commonly used but poorly defined concept in 
economic theory. A typical interpretation might be: Collectively used economic 
resources provided under natural or created monopolies. This issue of technological 
infrastructure, and policies oriented towards the ’steering’ and maintenance of 
infrastructure, is pursued further below. 
7HFKQRORJLFDOLQIUDVWUXFWXUHV
&KDUDFWHULVWLFVRIWHFKQRORJLFDOLQIUDVWUXFWXUHV
The notion of knowledge or technology infrastructures has been extensively used in a 
small strand of innovation literatures, key references being Tassey (1991), (1992), 
Justman (1993), Justman and Teubal (1995) and Teubal et al (1996). We note that 
this suggests technology infrastructures should be regarded as vital ingredients in 
innovation systems, whether defined in institutional or cognitive terms. Section 1 of 
this paper further suggests it is a subsystem of the innovation system, but a system 
that has considerable generic dimensions. There is thus a potential for such 
infrastructures to form the main backbone of the policy response to the systemic 
failures. Furthermore the term itself and its use suggest potentialities for designing 
infrastructures through policy formulation. These are issues that will be briefly 
discussed in this paper. 
We will suggest an approach where these and other characteristics are used as multi-
dimensional features to characterise such infrastructures. An early reference to such 
infrastructures approaching the sense we intend for this paper is Ergas (1987). In 
outlining the distinction between mission-oriented and diffusion-oriented national 
technology policies, he pointed to technological infrastructures –  the nation's 'system 
of education and training, its public and private research laboratories, its network of 
scientific and technological associations' – as a central determinant of technology 
policies facilitating role towards innovation performance. In that sense Ergas’ outline 
cited above is closer to the institutional approach, describing technological 
infrastructures in terms that reflect institutional RTD or science infrastructures as a 
prominent, if not distinguishing, part.  
Tassey (1991) describes these infrastructures in much wider terms, as 'science, 
engineering and technological knowledge available to private industry … embodied 
in human, institutional or facility forms'. He includes:  
• Generic technologies. Tassey’s use of this term is probably equivalent to 
'strategic' or 'emerging' technology in 1980's technology policy debates and is 
narrower and has a different orientation than the sense adopted here. Tassey 
describes generic technology as 'core product and process technologies from 
which specific commercial applications are developed through subsequent 
applied R&D by competing firms' (Tassey 1996). 
• Infratechnologies. This includes practices and techniques, basic data, 
measurement and test methods, etc. which support generic technology research 
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and its further use. He identifies four subcategories: scientific and engineering 
data; measurement and test methods; production practices and techniques; and 
interfaces that permit ’efficient physical and functional combinations of 
components into manufacturing and service systems’. 
• Technical information. 
• Research and test facilities. 
• Information for strategic planning and market development. 
• Forums for joint industry-government planning and collaboration, and 
• Assignment of intellectual property rights. 
The elements of technological infrastructures beyond generic technologies and 
infratechnologies are described somewhat differently in the three sources by Tassey. 
Compared to the specification in Tassey (1991), Tassey 1992 describes the 
remaining parts as PDQDJHPHQWSUDFWLFH(sometimes PDQXIDFWXULQJ(sic!) SUDFWLFH). 
Tassey 1996 refers to these as ’various techniques, methods and procedures that are 
necessary to implement the firm’s product and process strategies’. Explicit referrals 
are made in the latter two to concurrent engineering and TQM as major examples. 
Though the first outline gives rather heterogeneous cuts of technological 
infrastructures, the reformulated expression of technological infrastructures as 
generic technologies, infratechnologies and management practice may be interpreted 
as comprising generic dimensions of core market competencies. The salient point of 
this wide definition is that it focuses the economic resources, both bodies of 
knowledge and the conditions and practices related to their use and development, that 
these infrastructures comprise.  
&DSDELOLWLHVDQGLQIUDVWUXFWXUHV
An approach to technological infrastructures that makes the link between 
technological infrastructures and these economic resources explicit is suggested by 
Moshe Justman and Morris Teubal. Justman and Teubal identifies technological 
infrastructures as multi-user capabilities, that are contrasted with firm-based 
capabilities. They define a technological infrastructure as: 
 [A] set of FROOHFWLYHO\VXSSOLHG, VSHFLILF, industry-relevant FDSDELOLWLHV, 
intended for VHYHUDO DSSOLFDWLRQV in WZRRUPRUHILUPV or user organizations’ 
(Justman & Teubal, 1995: our emphases).  
In their introduction Teubal et al 1996 discuss a range of approaches to such 
infrastructures, ranging from more narrow approaches, as with ’science’ or 
’innovation’ infrastructures with a more clear-cut institutional dimension, to David 
and Foray’s structures for ’accessing and expanding’ a S&T knowledge base (David 
and Foray 1996), arguing that some ’firm-based capabilities might have to be 
included in any practical definition of the growth-promoting technological 
infrastructure’.  
The emphasis of capabilities, rather than (some notion of) a ’objectified’ knowledge 
stock implies a closer tie to industrial practice, to economic behaviour. They 
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explicitly note VSHFLILF capabilities, which further points in this direction. This has 
two important consequences for the conceptualisation of technological 
infrastructures. Firstly the use of capabilities relevant for industrial purposes as the 
core defining term sets technological infrastructures apart from science 
infrastructures. Secondly it implies that technological infrastructures cannot be 
constructed through public policy initiatives alone; construction of a technological 
infrastructure in the Justman/Teubal sense requires a considerable collaboration 
between firms and/or industrial associations and public agencies. 
However, one crucial aspect of technological infrastructures from the public policy 
perspective is that these capabilities complement and depend on firm-based 
capabilities, but their collective goods properties imply that they are not addressed by 
support for industrial R&D targeted at individual firms. Hence they require an 
explicit consideration in public policies. 
%DVLFDQGDGYDQFHGWHFKQRORJLFDOLQIUDVWUXFWXUHV
In their further development of the concept of technological infrastructure they 
distinguish between what they describe as two extreme types (implying that most fall 
somewhere in between), EDVLFand DGYDQFHG technological infrastructures. This 
reflects a differentiation in the forms of objectives variant infrastructures are 
expected to accomplish, responding to variations in the characteristics of the target 
firm populations. While basic technological infrastructures typically address the 
needs of SMEs in low- and medium-tech activities, advanced infrastructures are 
supposed to serve high-tech, leading-edge industries. Teubal (1996; 1998) further 
develops this perspective of an innovation policy approach to differences between 
firms in innovation capabilities and opportunities.  
Basic technological infrastructures provide technology services such as: 
• Design 
• Information on new production technologies 
• Testing and analysis 
• Solutions to environmental or ecological problems. 
to client firms. They comprise URXWLQHRUFRQYHQWLRQDO capabilities that are available, 
being directed towards enhancing the absorption of these capabilities by domestic 
firms. Given these characteristics they note in particular that these include activities 
that are pertinent to emergence of specialised expert consultants. This is the process 
of market building, referred to in the RISE proposal, which should be among the 
primary policy foci. The main task of basic technological infrastructures is to 
enhance diffusion of conventional, and hence specifiable, capabilities, through 
provision of technological services. Public agencies may therefore play well defined 
proactive roles, aiding target firms in clarification of user needs. 
Hence basic infrastructures will dominantly be capability PHGLDWLQJ, while advanced 
ones are generally focussed on capability FUHDWLRQ. The diffusion orientation of basic 
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technological infrastructures is paralleled by a LQQRYDWLRQ orientation by advanced 
infrastructures, the main task of these being to support and enhance innovation in 
functionally specific firms. 
(FRQRPLFFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIWHFKQRORJLFDOLQIUDVWUXFWXUHV
Smith (1997) is a significant attempt at outlining the economic characteristics and 
extent of knowledge infrastructures to give some order to what Teubal et al describes 
as the ’conceptual complexity and still-indistinct nature of the concept’. The 
discussion of infrastructures in general and technological infrastructures in particular 
in Smith (1997) will not be repeated here. Keith Smith suggests that what distinguish 
infrastructures from other economic resources are: 
• Indivisibility.  
• (Hence) technological economies of scale;  
• Multiple users, often implying network externalities; and  
• Generic functions.  
This suggests a provisional definition of infrastructures in general:  
Economic infrastructure consists of large-scale indivisible capital goods 
producing products or services that enter on a multi-user basis as inputs into 
most or all economic activities.6PLWKS 
Smith also emphasises requirement of discretionary investment decisions for its 
production as a further delineation of the concept. Thus he differentiates it from 
public institutions such as law systems. He characterises the resulting knowledge 
infrastructure as: 
[A] complex of public and private organizations and institutions whose role is 
the production, maintenance, distribution, management, and protection of 
knowledge. These institutions possess technical and economic characteristics 
that are not dissimilar to those of physical infrastructure … We could define 
the public knowledge infrastructure as consisting of a combination of these 
institutions and the flow of resources through them. 6PLWKS 
Smith's definition of the infrastructure implies a more restricted concept than 
Justman and Teubal. It is restricted to most or all economic activities, though the 
indeterminate reference to 'knowledge' without specification make the extent along 
these dimensions undecided. The Tassey definition is quite extensive on knowledge 
or capability dimensions, the extent in terms of economic functions is specified, but 
the context suggests a restriction similar to Smith's. 
Common for all these approaches is the idea that within the area of technology policy 
there is a set of core functionalities for which there is a substantial argument for 
public provision or organisation, and that these technological infrastructure policies 
should be a prime focus of policy formulation. In this context the discussion of the 
scope of infrastructures is important as it thus relates closely to the structure and 
scope of objectives of public innovation7 and technology policies. 
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,QVWLWXWLRQVDQGLQIUDVWUXFWXUHV
A problematic point to these authors is evidently how the relation between the 
structured (intangible) resources and its expression in social institutions should be 
treated. Though Smith starts out with emphasising not to consider the institutional 
frameworks, but the economic resources, as outlined above the public infrastructure 
is defined in institutional terms. The resolution of this conceptual difficulty, which is 
essentially the same as the one underlying the obvious difference in approach 
between the organisational, a la Richard Nelson, and the competency-based, a la 
Lundvall, approach to innovation systems, is central for policy analysis. Policy 
formulation in the first three decades of the post-war period was dominated by an 
institutional approach to these infrastructures, viz. institution building. During the 
following period, c. 1970 – 1985 an approach emerged of stronger focus on the 
'content' and intangible resources provided by the infrastructure. It seems to me that 
the last ten years have witnessed a further swing in policy attention to these 
infrastructures. A further consideration of the 'content' side has been accompanied by 
a stronger focus of requisites for the modes of institutional interaction between 
infrastructure institutions, as repositories of intangible infrastructure resources, and 
the clients or users of these.  
The conceptual complexity is substantial. An approach that will be followed up 
during the RISE project is an attempt at delineating and detailing technological 
infrastructures along four dimensions: 
• Economic characteristics; 
• Functional modes of embodiment; 
• Institutional structure; and 
• Handover formats. 
A significant aspect of provision of technological infrastructure services is the 
institutional embodiment of these infrastructures. The focus of the RISE project 
implies that we primarily focus the public policy perspective, with an emphasis of 
provision of technological infrastructures services or of TI-enabling initiatives that 
should be deliberate priorities of public policies. Hence we are describing provision 
which is:  
• Organised (a subset of Justman & Teubals collective provision); 
• Intended to have a sustained life-time beyond the solution of incidental 
technological bottle-necks; 
• To be provided, maintained and developed by institutions serving multiple users, 
without themselves being prime users of the infrastructure resources (to avoid 
proprietarisation' of infrastructure resources); and 
• Supported by specific policy action and funding. 
This institutional framework may involve public institutions (established, owned 
and/or otherwise organised) by public agencies, private institutions (organised by 
private firms or their representatives,  as industrial R&D associations, collaborative 
technology initiatives), or joint private-public organisations. Reflecting the variations 
in functional focus of technological infrastructures, even when we restrict attention 
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to technological, in the sense of techno-economic, capabilities, the institutional 
framework involves a wide range of organisations, cf. the Justman and Teubal 
spectrum of technological infrastructure institutions: 
• Industrial R&D institutions, 
• Technology service institutions, 
• National and regional advisory systems and ’competence centres’, 
• Standards organisations, 
• Testing and measurement labs, 
• Foresight agencies and organisations, 
• Industrially oriented development and demonstration programmes with 
infrastructure motives (as standardisation of modes of delivery; ’handover 
formats’), 
• Regional and national funding (both towards firms and towards infrastructure 
institutions) agencies with objectives focussed on industrial 
development/innovation. 
 
Several recent trends in the development of public innovation and industrial policies 
are relevant to a technological infrastructure focus, 
• In regional policies; from regional support policies to regional technology 
policies 
• Innovation/technology policies; from strategic technology development to 
systems/network based approaches to interactive innovation (from technology 
push to concertation) 
• Changes in institutional attitude; from institutional to functional approach to 
provision of technological infrastructure services (’privatisation’, increased 
reliance on market-emulating relations between infrastructure institutions and 
client firms) 
• The use of LQQRYDWLRQDJHQWVin the sense of Bessant & Rush (1994, 1998), cf. 
also OECD (1992)
0DUNHWEXLOGLQJDQGPDUNHWHPHUJHQFH
The core RISE hypotheses includes an hypothesis of the emergence of a private-
based, structure that fulfils functions partly complementary, partly substitutive to a 
publicly initiated/organised technological infrastructure. This is outlined in some 
more detail below. 
Teubal (1997) argues that a catalytic, evolutionary approach is needed to the 
formulation of horizontal technology policies in general, and to technological 
infrastructure policies more specifically. Horizontal innovation policies, which aim at 
promoting innovation and technical change in general rather than being specifically 
targeted at individual industrial or functional sectors, is a functional promotion of 
’socially desirable technological activities’ (SDTAs). SDTAs, which involve firm 
level R&D and innovation activities, transfer, diffusion and adoption of 
technological competencies, as well as technological infrastructures, are activities 
that (1) have strategic value to the economy and (2) are loci of market failures. The 
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objective of widespread and sustained use of SDTAs involve targeting 
institutionalisation (endogenisation) of extensive learning (e.g. ‘learning by others 
doing’) efforts and of ‘search’ (mapping, screening and other activities related to the 
identification of technological opportunities). In Teubal’s analysis, the successful 
promotion of SDTAs requires in addition market building; the establishment and 
development through policy initiatives of markets for 
• SDTA support services (such as advisory, financial and technological services), 
• certain types of SDTAs themselves (as providers of R&D services), 
• outputs flowing from SDTAs (f.i. measurement and test services). 
I agree with Teubal’s arguments that market building is an essential ingredient in 
horizontal technology policies, and in particular that the implementation of such 
policies requires a systematic approach to market building that reflects the diversity 
of firm and industry characteristics and technological capabilities. The economy-
wide promotion of SDTAs that meets requirements of SMEs as well as LENs, of 
firms in prospective product areas as well as in mature industries, of innovation 
laggards and vanguards requires substantial institutionalisation of these. Market-
building may be an efficient and important way of achieving this. In the promotion of 
SDTA support services, partly also in the market-built provision of SDTAs proper, 
we recognise Bessant and Rush’s innovation agents. In this sense the market based 
provision of such services following policy-implemented market building emerges as 
an integrated part of a wider technological infrastructure.  
However, the main point I want to make here is that there is a considerable 
endogenous dimension to the emergence of these markets. Markets for these services 
have been suggested to a large extent to have grown out of market generated 
demands and new divisions of labour, Hauknes (1999), being reflected in the rapid 
growth of KIBS services in a wide range of industrialised countries. The challenge of 
formulation of horizontal innovation policies must then start from the existence of 
these processes and a consideration of the market characteristics of these emerging 
‘knowledge’ or ‘competence’ markets. These processes form the major backbone of 
ongoing structural changes in the capability-generating and diffusing system in these 
economies, Bilderbeek et al (1998). den Hertog and Bilderbeek (1998) described it as 
the emergence of market-based ‘second knowledge infrastructures’ that supplements 
and transcends the public technological infrastructures that has been a main focus in 
postwar S&T policies. 
• KIBS are developing into an informal (private) or ‘second knowledge 
infrastructure’ partly complementing and partly competing with the more 
institutionalised formal (public) or “first (public) knowledge infrastructure”.   
• The boundaries between public and private knowledge-intensive (advisory) 
services tend to blur gradually, ultimately resulting in a more flexible capacity of 
external KIBS-professionals co-operating with internal KIBS professionals in 
providing knowledge intensive business services to clients. 
The developments of these KIBS sectors opens up new opportunities policy 
formulations in the sense of integrating a 'second knowledge infrastructure' approach 
into innovation policies. This entails a market building approach to this 'private 
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infrastructure’, the EU MINT programme, as well as the UK LINK programme 
should be interpreted as variants of a ’market building’ effort.  
Nowhere is the requirements to the richness of the innovation services provided 
larger than towards SMEs (cf. outline of basic technological infrastructure above). In 
fact the market building approach may be envisaged as a policy approach where the 
potential scope for an integrated SME focus is much larger than for traditional 
technology infrastructure policies. An SME focus on such policies raises a series of 
issues that may be considered to be of general validity, but have more serious impact 
in terms of SME dimensions. These issues concern: 
• The spectrum of services provided and their functional forms. 
• Issues related to limited opportunities for SMEs to assess the qualities of the 
RTD and innovation services rendered by incorporated public and private 
infrastructures, as certification,  
• Other aspects of the institutional framework of the associated markets, as 
ownership and other relations between service providers, 
• Formation and development of absorption or receptive capacities of client firms 
and industries, 
• Transferability of interaction-based experiential competencies of innovation 
service providers across firms and industries, 
• Character of and evolution of service providing functions’ core competencies, 
• Appropriate roles for public infrastructure policies. 
The SI4S project focussed several aspects of the endogenous emergence of 
‘knowledge’ or KIBS markets, and qualitative aspects of the user-producer relations 
on these markets. The final report from the project highlighted the following 
conclusions concerning the increased supply and use of KIBS functions (Bilderbeek 
et al 1998), 
• KIBS perform SDUH[FHOOHQFH a catalyst role in knowledge-creating or innovation 
processes of client firms. Their role varies from adding innovative knowledge 
originating from the KIBS itself (KIBS as a source of innovation), originating 
innovative knowledge from another source  to the client firm  (KIBS as carrier of 
innovation) or helping out a client in implementing new knowledge mostly 
developed in house (KIBS as a facilitator of innovation). 
• KIBS do play an important role in the various knowledge conversion processes. 
It can even be concluded that KIBS play a key role in transforming firms into 
learning organisations.  
• The types of knowledge interactions induced and triggered by KIBS are not 
confined to the discrete/tangible, contractual, explicit/codified and non-human 
embodied forms of knowledge transfer. On the contrary, the functioning and role 
of KIBS can only be understood if we include process-oriented/intangible, non-
contractual, tacit and human embodied forms of knowledge.  
• KIBS and their clients have a sort of relationship which might be characterised as 
an symbiotic relationship. They – or at least the professionals they employ - 
profit from the interaction with the client firms and the various types of 
knowledge flows generated during this process of interaction as much as the 
client firm does. The experience gained during a given project will be used as a 
basis for developing new service products and approaches and will make the 
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involved professionals more valuable professionals towards future clients with 
similar problems. KIBS are by the nature of their activities in contact and co-
operate with quite a number of client firms and their employees, constantly 
diffusing and absorbing knowledge, reprocessing it, diffusing it again, etc. 
Through their activities they act as bridging institutions in innovation systems (at 
whatever scale)and contribute considerably to the ’knowledge distribution 
capacity’ and learning capacity of innovation systems as a whole. 
A challenge for future research here is empirical and theoretical analysis of the initial 
formation of latent demand and of supply for these services, what the main 
determinants of this market emergence are, and how the rapid growth of these sectors 
over the last decades may be explained. Given the discussion above these are crucial 
issues for the future formulation of TIP policies. 
The next section will briefly describe the development of innovation policies in the 
postwar period, where some relevant aspects of these policy developments for the 
evolution of technological infrastructures will be identified. 
,QQRYDWLRQSROLF\LQWKHSRVWZDUSHULRG
In spite of innovation policy being a fairly recent term, industrial policies have 
always included objectives that focus industrial growth and generation, whether by 
supporting acquired comparative advantages or by facilitating new ones. In this sense 
innovation policy goes at least back to the industrial revolution in the UK. Though 
frequently used, often as here in conjunction with the term technology policies, there 
has been few attempts to outline in any systematic fashion what policies the term 
constitutes. Furthermore, in contrast to areas such as education and health policies, it 
is rarely identified in ministerial organisation. 
Attempts to outline the forms of policies often reflect Paul Stoneman’s definition 
(Stoneman 1987), as ’policies involving governmental intervention in the economy 
with the intent of affecting the process of technological innovation’ or David 
Mowery’s formulation that these are ’policies that are intended to influence the 
decisions of firms to develop, commercialize, or adopt new technologies’ (Mowery 
1992). Both these definitions emphasise the intentional aspect of the policies 
included; these are policies that we may term H[SOLFLW innovation policies. As such 
the relevant policy initiatives are mostly included among the areas of ministerial 
offices responsible for industrial policies, though they often also collaterally involve 
science or research ministries. Typically these policies involve grant schemes and 
other support for industrial innovation, supporting advisory systems, training 
schemes, setting-up of funding agencies, etc. These explicit innovation policies 
includes horizontal innovation policies as defined in section 2.6, but goes beyond 
these to also include ‘vertical’ or selective innovation policies.  
However, the term innovation policies is also frequently used to cover what we may 
term LPSOLFLW innovation policies, policy areas where impacts on innovation 
performance is not among the political prerogatives, but where the policy area 
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nevertheless has a significant impact on innovation performance. Such policy areas 
are usually taken to include fiscal and regulatory policies, public procurement, trade 
policies, etc. It is clear that these wider, implicit innovation policies then are 
significant determinants of the impact of explicit innovation policies. 
Several attempts have been made to develop periodisations of the S&T policies in the 
postwar period. Though not necessarily the same as innovation policies, the strong 
position of economic and industrial objectives in S&T policies, besides defense 
related objectives, in this period implies that trends in S&T policies will be a good 
proxy at least for trends in explicit and S&T related innovation policies. It is clear 
that any such classfication run the risk of over-simplification of a process that is 
many-sided, where inspiration runs across different eras or periods, where national 
policies may be multi-layered with different layers reflecting concerns of different 
epochs and where national variations may be substantial. In this section we will 
briefly describe some attempts at periodising these policies before giving a short 
outline of main trends in such policies over the postwar period. In doing this we will 
focus broader than technology infrastructure policies, but we will note explicitly 
some aspects of TIP policies where it is relevant. The general trends we outline 
nevertheless have consequences for TIP policies in providing a more general 
framework within which TIP policies are shaped, whether implicitly or explicitly. 
3HULRGLVDWLRQRI57’DQGVFLHQFHSROLFLHV
Stuart Blume (Blume 1985) distinguishes three phases in study of Dutch science 
policy after 1965, each characterised by its attitude towards science and research. 
The period 1965-1970 science is the ’engine of progress’, followed with a  period of 
science as ’problem solver’ between 1970 and 1980. The last period is characterised 
with science as the ’source of strategic opportunities’. Harvey Brooks (Brooks 1986)  
emphasises World War II as a watershed, leading to the introduction of the new 
’social contract’ between science and society following the impact of Bush Report 
(Bush 1945). With a US perspective he partitions the postwar period in three epochs: 
• The Cold War period extends from 1945 to 65; 
• The period of social priorities runs from 1965-78 and is followed by  
• The period of emphasis in innovation policy. (The rather specific boundary 
date between the latter two periods (1978) relates to President Carter's 
initiative that year to launch a policy review of industrial innovation.) 
That Harvey Brooks seems to suggest that innovation policies are a direct outgrowth 
of science policies, must probably be understood within a US perspective, where 
industrial and technology policies, in contrast to science policies, have been kept 
outside the federal responsibilities. 
Jean-Jacques Salomon distinguishes between the childhood of science policies up to 
1955, followed by a period characterised with 'pragmatism' between 1955 and the 
second half of the 1960s. During the latter period emphasis shifts from energy, 
defense and space research to industrial R&D. The period up towards the end of the 
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1970s, is an age of ’problematisation’, while from 1977-79 onwards science policies 
are interlinked with policies for re-industrialisation to meet basic structural problems 
in national economies. 
All of these point to a transition period located somewhere between 1965 and 1970, 
where S&T policy objectives change away from an often naïve link between 
scientific and welfare progress to focusing social objectives. In innovation policies 
this is also reflected in a transition  from ‘technology push’ to ‘market pull’ 
strategies. In addition they also point to a shift somewhere towards the end of the 
1970s and early 1980s, to strategic opportunities (Blume), industrial innovation 
(Brooks) or re-industrialisation (Salomon). As none of these cover the most recent 
period, ca. 1985 – 2000, their characterisation of their own present epoch may be 
influenced by myopia. However, these characterisations seem to catch some main 
aspects of the innovation and S&T policies that were dominant during the 1980s. The 
shift to strategic industrial objectives of S&T policies is accompanied by a 
reappraisal of market based mechanisms of technical change, a process that is 
concomitant with a shift in wider economic policies away from the broadly 
Keynesian policies of the postwar period. 
3HULRGLVDWLRQRILQQRYDWLRQSROLFLHV
The evolution of technology policy on the European scene is discussed by Rothwell 
and Dodgson (1992).  
VDQGV–VHSDUDWHGVFLHQFHDQGLQGXVWULDOSROLFLHV
During the 1950s and 1960s there were two main tracks of technology policies; resp. 
science and industrial policies with little coordination or active collaboration 
between policy makers from the two tracks. In some countries state intervention in 
industrial development was substantial. These policies were predicated on a ‘science 
discovers, technology pushes’ model of the innovation process, with a relatively 
clearcut division of labour between the science system and the industrial support 
system. Emphasis was on large firms and industrial agglomeration. 
V–LQQRYDWLRQSROLFLHV
Rothwell and Dodgson date the emergence of innovation policy to the early 1970s 
with a more direct involvement of collective research intitutes in product 
development of individual companies. Support schemes are broadened to cover 
wider innovation activities that before, with increasing support in new forms to 
SME-based innovation.  
V–WHFKQRORJ\SROLFLHV
During the early 1980s technology policies emerges, replacing the innovation 
policies of the 1970s. National programmes on generic technologies, primarily IT 
and to a lesser extent biotechnology, and  involved inter-institutional linkages 
focussed on collaborative pre-competitive research on the basis of increased inter-
departmental collaboration. University-industry linkages were focussed, as well as 
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strategic research in universities. Emphasis was put on NTBFs, while the availability 
of venture capital expanded. 
We take two additional points for the last period from Rothwell and Dodgson. This 
period saw growing pressure for accountability, for the research system to account 
for its resource use in terms of its societal impact, accompanied by increased 
evaluation of RTD policy initiatives and RTD institutions. After 1980 regional 
policies shifted from largely exogenous, formulated by national authorities. They 
characterise the regional policies of the 1980s as strongly endogenous, focussing 
mobilisation of regional industrial and technology resources.  The creation and 
enhancement of regional technology/transfer infrastructures, involving innovation 
centres, technopoles etc., is perhaps the most marked trend, 
Rothwell (1992) has outlined a generational taxonomy of (policy) approaches to 
innovation. Though it is not directly linked to a periodisation, the use of a 
generational model suggests a reflection of historical shifts of emphasis. He 
identifies five generations, of which the last is an idealized model of future 
development of integrated approaches to innovation: 
• First generation - R&D-based technology push, in a sequential process (1950s 
and early 1960s). 
• Second generation - need-pull with R&D as reactive to market trends and 
needs, in a sequential process (1970s). 
• Third generation - coupling mode of integration of R&D and marketing, in a 
sequential process with feedback (1980s). 
• Fourth generation - integrated mode, with parallel and integrated 
development, based on strong user-producer links, non-sequential processes 
(late 1980s and 1990s). 
• Fifth generation - systems integration and networking model (1995-2000 - ?). 
We have supplemented these generations with suggestions of which periods each 
was dominant. This generational model thus represents itself a sequential process of 
sophistication of innovation models, leading from simple production line, or socalled 
'linear', models to developed 'innovation systems' approaches to innovation and 
innovation policies. 
$EULHIVNHWFKRILQQRYDWLRQSROLFLHVLQWKHSRVWZDUSHULRG
In giving a brief sketch of postwar developments we will not directly use these 
periodisations. But the outline will reflect several of the concerns reflected in the 
schemes. For our purposes here, we focus explicit innovation policies. This is 
necessarily a limited perspective, but even a schematic outline of wider implicit 
innovation policies would go far beyond the RISE project. Since our main focus is 
technological infrastructures this focus of explicit innovation policies is probably 
sufficient as a basis for the further refinement of this sketch into a historical analysis 
of policy learning in the area of TIP policies. 
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During the postwar period these policies in Europe grew out of the political concern 
of reconstruction and the building of a new European industry after the war. A 
distinctive event at the beginning of this period was the publication of the Bush 
Report, Bush (1945), which laid the ground for the development of US science 
policies and led to the establishment of the National Science Foundation in 1950. 
From a European perspective it is probably an exaggeration to claim that the Bush 
Report was a decisive event. It is noteworthy for two reasons. Firstly it was to a large 
extent based on the experiences of the allied countries efforts into science-based 
development of defense technologies. Here the report summed up several ideas and 
experiences that shaped science and innovation policy making in several countries. 
Secondly the re-interpretation of the Bush Report that followed its publication 
provided arguments that were widely used also in European countries. This re-
interpretation is best captured by the argument of a ‘social contract’ between the 
science system and society.  
Broadly the noted concern took two forms, the emergence of new S&T policies with 
the establishment of new or reorganised S&T agencies, and emphasis of state-owned, 
-managed or -organised industrial enterprises. The first led to institutions as NSF in 
the US, while Clement Atlee's nationalisation of UK core industries in 1948 may 
illustrate the second. 
Though the so-called 'Sputnik shock' was interpreted in its time as a signal of the 
failure of Western industrial policies to generate unparalleled industrial growth and 
technological leadership, the period 1950-1970 has since been characterised as the 
'golden era' with a substantially higher income and production growth in the OECD 
area than anytime before or after. Nevertheless the Sputnik shock lead to an intense 
development of S&T policies, first in the US, later through the organisation created 
on the basis of the Marshall Aid and OEEC, the OECD. An indicative event here is 
the development of the first versions of what became known as the Frascati-manual, 
as well as the background report OECD 1963.  
This period, which Salomon notes is a period of pragmatism, is a period where 
evidently some of the naïvetes of the previous belief in the welfare generating 
potential of the science effort were questioned. It is in this period the Arrow-Nelson 
rationale  was developed, but it is also the period in which the growth accounting 
residual (Abramowitz 1956, Solow 1957) was noted widely for the first time with its 
claim that technical change is an almost totally dominant source of economic growth. 
What was later denoted the Minerva debate, after the journal in which most 
contributions were published (later published in Shils 1968), shows substantial 
questioning of contemporary S&T objectives. In this period the establishment of an 
institutional infrastructure aiding national industries was prominent in national S&T 
policies, many of the institutional characteristics of the national systems of S&T 
institutions, as R&D institutions, structures of HEIs, technological service 
institutions etc., reflect policy developments in this period. 
For economic development after 1970, it is common to point to the OPEC crises of 
1973-4 and 1978-9 as events that had dominant effects on future growth. Also 
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important for the orientation of S&T and innovation policies was the shift in focus to 
social priorities and market needs, as noted above. In 1971 the Rotschild report, 
establishing the customer-contractor principle, was published as a UK Green Paper. 
When Richard Nixon was elected in 1968 he was elected on a programme that 
featured social priorities prominently (Averch 1985), one of his first S&T policy 
initiatives was the launching of the War on Cancer in 1969. A symptomatic landmark 
of the onset of this period is the OECD Brooks Report, published in 1971 (OECD 
1971). Environmental concerns, as well as issues of social reform, were factors that 
shaped the profiles of S&T policies, as well as the portfolios of policy instruments. 
Program-organised, targetted research becomes a strong mode of organising research 
priorities. 
It is in this period that the international policy debate starts using the term ’innovation 
policies’, by 1980 the term is used as a wellknown term in OECD fora, see eg OECD 
1982. What is happening in this period is a specialisation of S&T policies, with 
emerging policy focus of the need to direct attention to other issues than the former 
S&T dominated policies, relying heavily on scientific research as the main vehicle. 
At the end of the decade focus is widely attended to giving priority to ’strategic 
research’, to (technological) research areas that are potentially widely applicable, 
later often claimed to be generic in applicability, but which require substantial 
scientific research and development to reach a stage where it is commercially 
applicable. The first document that identifies strategic research priorities is the UK 
Dainton Report, published together with the Rotschild report in HMSO (1971), but in 
full disconcord with its conclusions. 
In the period after 1980 the area of innovation policy debate involves an increased 
focus on regional competition of technological hegemony. Contributing to this was 
the increased awareness of the productivity slowdown after 1973 and the idea of a 
’new economic and social context’ that science and technology policies had to meet, 
as argued in the OECD Delapalme Report, OECD 1980. The increased perception of 
a ’Japanese challenge’ in Europe and the US was accompanied by the idea of Fortress 
Europe in US. International debate was increasingly formulated in terms of the Triad; 
the perceived triangular technology competition between Europe, US and Japan. 
When Japan launched its fifth generation programme for development of information 
technologies towards 2000 in the footsteps of the highly succesful VLSI project, it 
was quickly followed by IT and other technology initiatives in US and the European 
countries (Rothwell and Dodgson 1992). Based on the notion of generic technology, 
mainly meaning information and materials technology and microbiology based 
biotechnology, a dominant trend in many countries was the implementation of large 
scale policy initiatives to build up the national and regional capabilities that were 
perceived as necessary to compete and survive in sunrise industries of tomorrow.  
Not surprisingly there were many responses in the area of information and 
communication technologies. The French Nora-Minc report, Nora and Minc (1980), 
published in French in 1978, also contributed to set the pace for a subsequent focus 
of LQIRUPDWLTXH and WHOHPDWLTXH. During the mid-1980s the initiatives to establish 
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national programmes of ICT proliferated. In the UK the Alvey programme was 
initiated in 1985, in Sweden the IT4 programme was launched in 1986-87, while the 
Norwegian IT ’target area’ was introduced in 1986. On the European scene this 
period was accompanied by the establishment of ESPRIT, the EU large scale IT 
RTD  programme, in 1982 and later the first Framework Programme in 1984, as well 
as President Mitterand’s intitiative that led to the establishment of EUREKA in 1985. 
In this period funding agencies and R&D institutions that had been a central part of 
S&T policies in the postwar period incresingly came under scrutiny. The main aspect 
of the criticisms that were raised were addressed to agencies lacking ability to 
address the long term issues of building up national capabilities in these generic 
technologies, processes that eventually led to reorganisation of funding agencies in 
many countries. 
Towards the end of this decade and into the 1990s it was frequently argued that 
fundamental changes in research and science-based innovation policies were 
emerging, there were “many signs that we amy be looking at the end of an era, with 
the possiblity of a much greater discontinuity on science policy than … transitions in 
the mid-60s and late 70s … it is possible that we face … a ‘sea-change’ in the role of 
science and technology comparable to what took place after World War II” (Brooks 
(1990, p 19). The S&T system in the new era must fulfill stronger demands of 
societal steering (Yoxen 1988), accountability and collectively organised research, 
with ‘science in a steady state’ of public funding (Ziman 1987). During the 1980s the 
use of assessments and evaluations exploded. In parallel the literature on research 
and policy evaluation, on evaluation methodologies, practice and indicators boomed. 
To what extent this was paralleled by a systematic use of evaluation efforts for 
building a policy oriented knowledge base was widely discussed at the time and is 
still unclear. 
A signpost for the developments of innovation policies in the 1990s was the 
publication of the OECD Sundqvist Report in 1988 (OECD 1988). The main 
message was the need of a 'socio-economic strategy' for technological change, the 
report argued that traditional approaches to the relevant policies had been to narrow 
in neglecting the interdependence of technical, economic and social change. The 
policy objectives of technology policies should feature 'the effectiveness of social 
systems which generate and diffuse technical innovations' prominently. With the first 
indications of an emerging system approach to technological innovation the report 
reflected ongoing changes of emphasis in member countries. Policy attention was 
increasingly directed at the powers to mediate and diffuse innovation capabilities in 
national systems. 
The Sundqvist Report was a direct precursor for establishment of the OECD 
Technology and Economy Programme, a substantial effort to synthesise recent 
research into innovation processes and formation of innovation capabilities, OECD 
1991 and OECD 1992. The period after 1990 has substantiated these systems and 
network approaches to innovation further, together with a significant increase in the 
use of innovation analysis and research as input to policy making processes. With the 
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third and fourth framework programmes the profile of EU S&T policies has shifted 
to include specific socio-economic objectives and related research. This process has 
further been developed in the new structure that was introduced into the fifth 
framework programme. 
These most recent developments in innovation policies highlights changes in the 
roles of the traditional organisations being parts of national S&T systems. The use by 
several national authorities of ’innovation agents’, such as in the UK Link, the EU 
MINT and the Norwegian BUNT programmes, involve attempts to build markets for 
innovation services that have been within the realm of S&T institutions. It would 
seem, though this needs substantiating further, that in parallel to the policy 
developments there is a shift in policy emphasis from S&T institutional 
infrastructures to provision of infrastructural function or services. 
’LVWULEXWHGNQRZOHGJHJHQHUDWLRQDQGWKHFDSDELOLWLHVRIILUPV
6WUXFWXUDOFKDQJHLQNQRZOHGJHJHQHUDWLRQDQGGLVWULEXWLRQ
The enhanced role of knowledge and information as productive resources has lead to 
increased demand for productive knowledge, as well as for analytic capabilities in 
selecting, refining, transforming and using it. These tendencies have reinforced the 
processes of professionalising business practice, of the growth of managerial 
capitalism, in the Chandler sense. The increased strategic importance of access to 
and capability to use information and knowledge inputs rapidly, emphasise the 
importance of abilities to identify, transform and regenerate these inputs to enable 
direct and indirect implementation and use of these information inputs. These 
bridging functions between flows and repositories of information and knowledge 
external to a firm and internal use of (regenerated) information and knowledge is 
vital to achieve accomplish effective dissemination and use of these inputs. 
The underlying resourcebased view of the firm, with capabilities and competencies 
as a central dimension of what constitutes a firm, implies that competencies and 
capabilities and hence learning processes are localised or specific, rather than global 
and general. The indicated trends have facilitated a process that has involved the 
emergence of NQRZOHGJHPDUNHWV, and a concomitant growth of a class of functions 
that have been described broadly as ’knowledge intensive business services’. These 
processes have lead to specialisation in bridging functions and professionalisation of 
expertise. Increasingly these bridging functions have therefore been encapsulated in 
new bridging institutions within the ’learning’ economy. The knowledge intensive 
service firms play a role in national innovation systems that supplements and 
broadens the generative and distributive functions that traditionally have been the 
responsibility of the public S&T infrastructures, R&D institutions, advisory and 
extension services etc. 
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The growing importance of bridging between external repositories and flows of 
knowledge, the sourcing of external capabilities and expertise and internal 
competencies and capabilities clearly increases further the needs of tapping into these 
flows. Knowledge intensive services as bridging institutions are evidently at the core 
of these processes, also themselves promoting a process of cumulative causation that 
may possibly affect the general division of labour in knowledge production. The 
bridging function is essentially the creation and adaptation of channels of 
communication between external and internal repositories of knowledge. However, 
these flows are not ’energy’ flows that are sufficient capacities for action by firms 
tapping into them. The essential feature of such bridging functions is that they 
require genuine transformation and regeneration into the specific circumstances of 
any firm, it requires bridging between generally accessible knowledge and 
information and localised capabilities and competencies. Hence the importance of 
specialised appreciative transformation capabilities on the hand of bridging 
entrepreneurs. 
The generation and diffusion of innovations and information about them rely more 
and more upon knowledge which is generated not only by learning processes 
implemented by internal research and development laboratories but also and to a 
growing extent, by the daily interaction, communication and trading of information 
of learning firms among themselves and with other scientific institutions. The 
knowledge intensive business service firms play a major role in this context as 
qualified interfacing bridging institutions.  
The intensified role of such processes indeed make the label of a knowledge 
intensive or learning economy apt. Obvious characteristics of the emerging 
knowledge markets and bridging functions and institutions is then (i) suppliers with 
specialised functional and intermediary expertise and skills, and (ii) interactive 
learning between suppliers and clients that impacts clients’ production capabilities 
and competencies. The latter point implies that the bridging institutions are producers 
of intermediate inputs, their clients are other firms and organisations, both within the 
private and public sectors. The criteria for identifying knowledge intensive business 
service suppliers as new bridging institutions are: 
• The constituent role of suppliers' specialised expertise, usually integrated 
with professional knowledge. 
• They supply intermediate inputs, rather than output for final consumption. 
Their 'products' may both be bundled with or supplied independently of other 
tangible or intangible input factors. 
• The 'products' are intended intermediate inputs into clients' capability 
generating and processing processes. 
,PSOLFDWLRQVRIVWUXFWXUDOFKDQJH
The new patterns of knowledge generation and distribution involve more than a 
direct extension of the existing system. The phenomenon of emerging knowledge 
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markets and of a new form of bridging institutions is both a symptom of and will in 
itself reinforce processes of qualitative change in innovation systems. 
We are now witnessing an emerging mode of organisation of knowledge production, 
towards a progressive unbundling of the production of knowledge, through expertise 
specialisation and institutional creation of knowledge markets. Production of 
knowledge becomes the core activity of specialised firms whose product consists in 
new technological and scientific information which can be sold in the market place. 
Reorganisation of knowledge production is associated with increasing appropriability 
of expertise and localised knowledge. Distributed production of knowledge generates 
forms of knowledge that are integrated composites of tacit and explicit expertise 
generated within differentiated contexts that are oriented towards and even 
constituted by application areas. Variants of this mode of knowledge production have 
been suggested earlier. Aspects of it is evident in Roy Rothwell’s ’fifth generation’ 
innovation model (Rothwell 1992), as well as in the Mode 2 production of 
knowledge described by Michael Gibbons and collaborators (Gibbons et al 1992). 
Michel Callon has outlined a somewhat different variant, in his version it has been 
described as a ’privatising’ capturing of knowledge production by techno-economic 
networks (Callon 1994). 
It is nothing new that the modes of production of knowledge involve joint production 
and use of tacit and explicit, or articulated, knowledge. The new mode leads us to 
emphasise is that in modern economies the following apply in substantial parts of 
knowledge production: 
i) Knowledge production and distribution is distributed and involves distributed 
and localised contexts of application. 
ii) The production structure evolves towards more distributed structures and 
institutions. 
iii) However, enhanced information and network technologies may expand the 
sphere of influence, or ’market extension’, of each producer. 
iv) A closer alignment of specialised production and supply with expanding and 
differentiate demand patterns of potential client with opportunity, capability 
and willingness to buy. 
v) With such knowledge production and its frontiers being shaped by this 
market interaction in a fundamental way, significant elements of distributed 
knowledge production are generated in the interaction process of clients and 
providers; it is generated ’on the market place’. 
vi) Hence this mode involves new incentive structures and new agendas of 
knowledge production, and implies rather different processes of quality 
control and cumulation of knowledge. 
vii) Lastly, it involves a diversity of new forms, new codification patterns, and 
bundling into other product markets of knowledge transmission or 
interaction, alongside with traditional modes of transmission/interaction. 
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,QQRYDWLRQSROLFLHVZLWKGLVWULEXWHGNQRZOHGJHJHQHUDWLRQ
Until now, the economic importance of generic scientific knowledge as the unique 
result of formal R&D conducted in-house by firms and scientific activities conducted 
by universities, has been exaggerated. R&D expenditure as an adequate indicator of a 
firm’s productivity performance is equally misguided. As a consequence too much 
emphasis has been put upon R&D policies and more generally science policies as the 
basic tools to sustain the rates of accumulation of new knowledge. Tacit knowledge, 
acquired by localised personal experience and individual learning processes, is also a 
major source of technological knowledge. In fact, many small firms generate 
significant innovations based mainly on tacit localised knowledge; and many larger 
firms actually fail in the diffusion of innovative initiatives in unrelated activities 
because of a lack of tacit-learning appropriation opportunities. There is thus a basic 
need for an economic environment which encourages the accumulation of such tacit 
knowledge and enables its interaction with the codified counterparts.  
In the generation of new technological innovations, firms rely on external knowledge 
acquired by means of informal interactions between themselves, sharing learning 
opportunities and experience, and with other, established sources of knowledge and 
information and more formal processes of technological co-operation. Outsourcing 
of research activities and the procurement of knowledge intensive business services 
also plays an increasing role in assessing the innovative capabilities of each firm. 
The levels of outsourcing of knowledge intensive business services should be 
accounted for when assessing the amount of inputs invested in the process of 
research and learning. The outsourcing of knowledge-intensive services could 
become an important recipient for policy interventions.  
The innovative characteristics of the firm and the topology of the economic spaces 
into which it is embedded dictate the terms of communication and information 
exchange between firms, ultimately determining their innovative capabilities. We can 
identify three such ’architectural’ factors in particular: the individual resources 
designated to the internal accumulation and implementation of tacit and codified 
knowledge; the receptivity to outside technological knowledge; and the connectivity 
and distribution network, in terms of knowledge, between firms. The quality of and 
accessibility to the information and communication technology infrastructure is also 
a significant indicator of an economy’s innovative potential.  
The topology of innovation systems and the quality of their communication networks 
can be greatly enhanced by the new key-sectors such as the knowledge intensive 
business services industries. The conditions of communication, dissemination, 
distribution, access and the quality of knowledge-intensive business service have 
important effects on the economic system in terms of innovative capacity. Countries 
with an advanced supply of knowledge intensive business services are likely to have 
stronger communication capability in terms of connectivity and receptivity levels and 
hence higher innovation capabilities. The services of consultants and advisers 
improve connectivity between agents, sharing learning experiences and creating 
learning opportunities, thus also enhancing receptivity. Similarly, advanced business 
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services, in terms of distribution, competence and access, improve the interaction 
between tacit and codified knowledge, helping to introduce increasingly individual 
technological and organisational innovations. Such a dynamic situation can be of 
particular benefit to small- and medium-sized firms, compensating for the high costs 
of in-house R&D and the technological knowledge it helps generate. 
More generally, traditional innovation policies based upon incentive schemes mainly 
designed to increase the levels of R&D could be reoriented in order to take into 
account the communication properties of innovation systems. Policies enhancing 
technological co-operation between firms and between firms and universities and 
specifically technological outsourcing are important in this context. Technological 
outsourcing may be pushed by active demand and supply policy specifically 
designed to favour the specialisation of firms in well defined technological niches 
and the implementation of technological cooperation aimed at internalising rent 
technological externalities and increasing spatial stochastic interactions probability.  
Advanced countries with well designed innovation systems are likely, over time, to 
experience a continual increase in innovative capability levels provided that positive 
feed-backs take place either ’spontaneously’ or as a result of technology policies and 
strategies. Successful agents rooted within innovation systems can learn to 
communicate, in terms of both connectivity and receptivity, as soon as they realise 
that their innovation capability is positively influenced by the communication 
network and subsequently take advantage of increasing returns and positive 
feedbacks in learning both internal and external to each firm.  
This entails a rather fundamental shift in the basis and rationales for innovation and 
technology policies. The dominant mode of policy formulation has been in terms of 
design supply functions, where the main challenge of policy formulation has been to 
identify key areas for the development of strategic technology inputs to business 
sectors. The ongoing reorganisation of knowledge generation to a distributed 
production system around markets for knowledge makes challenges for public policy 
simpler, and more difficult. They get simpler in that they allow an emancipation from 
the market failure rationales of innovation and R&D policies, with their conflation of 
the objectives of public policies with a fictitious benchmark of perfectly functioning 
markets. They contribute with a clearer demarcation of public and private objectives 
of innovation policies.  
On the other hand these challenges make policy formulation more difficult. The 
innovation policy challenges that are raised, are clearly much more indirectly related 
to the actual unfolding of industrial innovation. Policy objectives will be more open-
ended and framework enabling than oriented towards specific technological or 
economic objectives, with three core areas of policy formulation. 
First, public policy should ensure the distributive capacities of broader innovation 
systems, both in terms of material and immaterial infrastructures and in terms of 
counteracting tendencies to locking in of knowledge markets on specific techno-
economic objectives. This also includes facilitating extension and entry of these 
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production and distribution systems into economic areas outside those ’high tech’ 
areas that dominate the present developments. 
Furthermore, an essential element of the new production mode is the building up of 
systematic absorption capacities on client firms. Public policy has an obvious role in 
enabling this process of professionalising potential users that face barriers cost or 
attention barriers, notably for firms and sectors where conditions for linking up with 
the new production system is weakly developed. This would seem in particular 
relevant for certain categories of SMEs. This regards development of in-house 
capabilities to utilise the distributed production system, as well as capabilities to 
assess and evaluate services that are offered on the market. 
A pertinent issue here is needs of formal and informal standardisation, certification 
etc. It will be required that public policy includes an aspect of regulation, in some 
cases it may still be necessary for public regulation and certification, through 
educational requirements and otherwise. In other cases a more appropriate role is to 
enable development and proficiency of industrial and professional networks and 
organisations. 
Thirdly, a core area is ensuring flexible interaction of the distributed system of 
knowledge producers and the public system of universities and other scientific 
institutions, institutions of higher education and so on, that allows a sound division of 
labour. This does not imply a tightening of the requirements of user orientation and 
industrial needs of academic institutions. Such responsiveness is well developed in a 
few industrial areas, with well forged links between academia and industry, most 
notably in the pharmaceutical industry and micro biology based production, as well 
as between the geo-physical sciences and geological surveying and petroleum 
exploration. The point is that there are several specific factors of each of these areas 
that aligns institutions; these are not role models that can be applied generally for 
academia-industry links.  
Rather the implication is to emphasise the mutual and reinforcing advantages in 
allowing a complementary rather than a collateral division of labour emerge. Though 
conditions would vary, a measure that would enrich interactions as well as enhance 
the benefits and network building effects from the education objectives of academic 
institutions is dual and mixed careers. 
A further case may be raised in the role of public policy and policy agencies as 
market makers and mediators. This role has been taken up to some measure in the 
use of ’innovation agents’ in public innovation policy programmes, see Bessant and 
Rush 1994, 1998. However, we may also envisage a wider role given the accepted 
legitimacy and independence of public agencies, in terms of advising, mediating and 
’broking’ between KIBS producers and users. 
In terms of institutional sectors, the challenges these trends raise are probably largest 
for public or semi-public R&D infrastructures that are organised or substantially 
funded from public sources to serve industrial innovation. Examples here are the 
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Dutch TNO and the Finnish VTT organisations, Norwegian industrial R&D 
institutes, as well as to some extent the German Fraunhofer institutions and 
French/Italian style research council based organisations. These institutions may 
increasingly find themselves in a situation where they may be criticised for 
subsidised activity in competition with the new market actors. For several 
organisations as these a rational alternative will probably be to enforce the 
institution’s role in developing a general scientific knowledge infrastructure, on par 
with the role of academic institutions. On the other hand institutions as these are 
large enough to be able to shape the knowledge ’industries’ and markets themselves. 
It is obvious that the responsibilities this implies for public policies in surveying and 
assessment, are many and complex. 
We do not envisage a wholesale shift in restructuring of public policies, this will 
probably be a gradual process. Furthermore, as with the former shifts in emphasis of 
innovation policies, there will be layers of sedimentation with new and former 
approaches and modes of knowledge production will coexist. However, even a 
partial development along the lines we have suggested here implies the need for a 
rethinking of rationales and implementation strategies for public innovation policies. 
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
67(3JUXSSHQEOHHWDEOHUWLIRUnIRUV\QH
EHVOXWQLQJVWDNHUHPHGIRUVNQLQJNQ\WWHWWLODOOH
VLGHUYHGLQQRYDVMRQRJWHNQRORJLVNHQGULQJPHG
V UOLJYHNWSnIRUKROGHWPHOORPLQQRYDVMRQ
¡NRQRPLVNYHNVWRJGHVDPIXQQVPHVVLJH
RPJLYHOVHU%DVLVIRUJUXSSHQVDUEHLGHU
HUNMHQQHOVHQDYDWXWYLNOLQJHQLQQHQYLWHQVNDSRJ
WHNQRORJLHUIXQGDPHQWDOIRU¡NRQRPLVNYHNVW’HW
JMHQVWnUOLNHYHOPDQJHXO¡VWHSUREOHPHURPNULQJ
KYRUGDQSURVHVVHQPHGYLWHQVNDSHOLJRJ
WHNQRORJLVNHQGULQJIRUO¡SHURJKYRUGDQGHQQH
SURVHVVHQInUVDPIXQQVPHVVLJHRJ¡NRQRPLVNH
NRQVHNYHQVHU)RUVWnHOVHDYGHQQHSURVHVVHQHUDY
VWRUEHW\GQLQJIRUXWIRUPLQJHQRJLYHUNVHWWHOVHQDY
IRUVNQLQJVWHNQRORJLRJLQQRYDVMRQVSROLWLNNHQ
)RUVNQLQJHQL67(3JUXSSHQHUGHUIRUVHQWUHUW
RPNULQJKLVWRULVNH¡NRQRPLVNHVRVLRORJLVNHRJ
RUJDQLVDWRULVNHVS¡UVPnOVRPHUUHOHYDQWHIRUGH
EUHGHIHOWHQHLQQRYDVMRQVSROLWLNNRJ¡NRQRPLVN
YHNVW


7KH67(3JURXSZDVHVWDEOLVKHGLQWRVXSSRUW
SROLF\PDNHUVZLWKUHVHDUFKRQDOODVSHFWVRI
LQQRYDWLRQDQGWHFKQRORJLFDOFKDQJHZLWKSDUWLFXODU
HPSKDVLVRQWKHUHODWLRQVKLSVEHWZHHQLQQRYDWLRQ
HFRQRPLFJURZWKDQGWKHVRFLDOFRQWH[W7KHEDVLV
RIWKHJURXS•VZRUNLVWKHUHFRJQLWLRQWKDWVFLHQFH
WHFKQRORJ\DQGLQQRYDWLRQDUHIXQGDPHQWDOWR
HFRQRPLFJURZWK\HWWKHUHUHPDLQPDQ\XQUHVROYHG
SUREOHPVDERXWKRZWKHSURFHVVHVRIVFLHQWLILFDQG
WHFKQRORJLFDOFKDQJHDFWXDOO\RFFXUDQGDERXWKRZ
WKH\KDYHVRFLDODQGHFRQRPLFLPSDFWV5HVROYLQJ
VXFKSUREOHPVLVFHQWUDOWRWKHIRUPDWLRQDQG
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIVFLHQFHWHFKQRORJ\DQG
LQQRYDWLRQSROLF\7KHUHVHDUFKRIWKH67(3JURXS
FHQWUHVRQKLVWRULFDOHFRQRPLFVRFLDODQG
RUJDQLVDWLRQDOLVVXHVUHOHYDQWIRUEURDGILHOGVRI
LQQRYDWLRQSROLF\DQGHFRQRPLFJURZWK 
 
